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Executive Officer
Intelligence Community Staff

Attached is the memo
we spoke about.

2 apr 84.

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30 March 1984

2 APR 1984
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director

FROM: James H. Taylor
                   Inspector General

SUBJECT: Intelligence Leaks

REFERENCE: Memo for Multi fr DCI, dtd 23 March 1984,
                   Subj: Intelligence Leaks and Counterterrorism
25X1   Capabilities

     1. I have one thought on the subject of leaks which may not already have been expressed by the others asked to contribute ideas. Many of us are struck by the fact that our collective attitude towards secrecy and classification is very different from what it was ten years ago. Not long ago most Agency employees understood that _everything_ we did was secret as far as the outside world was concerned--where we worked, who our coworkers were, what we did, how we felt about what we did, even what we thought about the events of the day. There didn't seem to be any gray areas. If you worked for CIA, everything about that relationship was _considered_ classified, even when--strictly speaking--it wasn't. There wasn't much room for misunderstanding; the rules were very simple and easy to communicate to every one of our more than 15,000 employees.

     2. Today there is less certainty at all levels in the organization as to what is or is not appropriately shared with people outside CIA. Many of us seem to believe that we can be "more open" about what we can or can't discuss with acquaintances outside the Agency. The change in attitude reflects a number of developments over the past decade including these:

-- Much previously classified information became available to the public during the 1970's and continues to appear with excessive regularity in the media.

-- We continue to see examples of senior people who leave the Agency and seem able to publish a good deal about what they did when here.

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-- FOIA has contributed to a general impression that <u>some</u>
of what we say or do here is unclassified.

-- Even the adoption of paragraph-by-paragraph
classification has helped erode our previous sense
that <u>everything</u> we did was confidential.

3. Just as important, I think we, as an Agency, have
evolved a series of policies and attitudes that send <u>mixed</u> and
possibly confusing signals to our employees about how we as an
organization see our relationship to the world outside the
Washington national security community. Witness our occasional
tortured arguments about whether an Agency person should appear
before this scholarly forum or that technical symposium. It
may be irrelevant whether overall we are making consistently
sensible decisions about the participation of Agency people in
debates, media events, academic proceedings, or technical
symposia. Rather, in approving "public" appearances and
otherwise sometimes supporting our involvement in unclassified
activities, we may be encouraging a general understanding that
our employees can exercise their own judgment in deciding
day-by-day what they can say to outsiders. (Probably very few
mistakes are really made. But a few are too many.) In any
event, despite some serious attempts to explain our views to
our employees, I believe the distinction between what is
classified and what is not, or what can be discussed and what
cannot, is less clear than ever before. Does this "blurring"
help establish a climate in which leaks become acceptable? I
think that the answer to this has to be "to some degree, yes."

4. Certainly I wouldn't suggest that all the leaks around
Washington are attributable to Agency people or practices. But
it seems to me that the process of re-instilling some disci-
pline in our government about the handling of classified
information might begin with us. Maybe we can never get the
various genies back in their bottles. <u>But should not our
primary goal be to recreate internally a broadly shared
attitude that there is nothing about what we do which is an
appropriate subject for discussion with people outside the
building who lack the appropriate clearances?</u> Clearly this
could not be accomplished in a year or two; but I think it
might be done in five. Where specifically would we begin?
Probably we should start with some fact-gathering as to the
nature and frequency of all relationships with the outside
world (other than those which are 100 percent related to our
work) by Agency employees. Excluded from any review would be
such obvious activities as efforts to recruit assets, all
authorized briefing activities, relationships with contractors
where the relationship or product is classified, etc. Armed

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with a comprehensive understanding of the size and scope of the problem, we could change our policy and review procedures as appropriate.

     5.   Finally, I wish to comment on Stan Sporkin's suggestion that we find a way to hand over for investigation a leak case to some kind of unimpeachable outside expert such as a special prosecutor. It is true that there are many accusations that politics or preserving an Administration's reputation dictate our responses toward a specific leak problem. It is also true that probably neither we nor anyone else in Congress or the Executive Branch has the creditability that is necessary to address and satisfactorily resolve too many of the leak cases we see. There is, of course, a danger to adopting a "special prosecutor" approach. There will be cases--as there are now--where we will not be willing to share information with a special prosecutor. We will one day find ourselves in a situation where we can't satisfactorily explain why we are unwilling to take Case B forward when we yesterday pressed for a resolution of Case A. And given the perversity of the world, we will probably look like we're trying to cover something up when we find ourselves in that position.

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